The Promises, Threats, and Political Implications of Deep-Sea Mining Towards Energy Transition

As the threat of climate change continues to loom closer on the horizon, and the pressing need for resources to meet energy transition targets, attention has shifted to the largely unexplored depths of the ocean. Deep-sea mining (DSM) emerges as a potential remedy to address these challenges, with polymetallic nodules in the seabed holding crucial resources to fuel energy transition. However, the promising prospects of DSM are accompanied by significant challenges, including environmental risks, the uncertainties of the deep ocean, and the possibility of DSM as a key domain for power politics. Given these circumstances, this article aims to examine the potential of DSM—both its possible benefits and risks—in supporting energy transition and explore its implications for international politics.

Composed of critical minerals required to support green initiatives and manufacture renewable technologies, the DSM industry gained significant attention in recent years. The deep seabed—the ocean floor below 200 meters—is covered by rocks known as polymetallic nodules that are filled with minerals such as lithium, nickel, manganese, rare earth elements (REE), and many other metals crucial in manufacturing renewable technology^[1][2]. Combined with the increased demand for such minerals to meet global energy transition targets, and the depletion and costly extraction of terrestrial resources, DSM presents a viable solution to these issues^[3][4]. Studies suggest that DSM may increase the metals supply necessary for renewable technologies^[5]. This, in turn, could significantly reduce the manufacturing costs of solar panels, wind turbines, battery production, and electric cars, thereby making the global transition more accessible^[6][7].

Building on this promise, statistics, and evidence support the notion that DSM could be pivotal in addressing resource challenges and combating climate change. Researchers have noted the resources within the seabed contain a calculated total resource potential of 67.53 Mt on average for an area of 75.000km2, containing metals like manganese, nickel, copper, zinc, and cobalt ^[8][9]. Moreover, projections suggest that DSM activities could span ocean areas ranging from 17 million km2 to upwards of 50 million km2^[10]. When we roughly calculate the conservative average of the seabed’s resource potential in 67Mt within a sample area of 75.000km2, the resource potential of DSM could reach numbers of 15 to 44 billion tonnes. In contrast, the latest report from 2020 reported that terrestrial mining amounts to 17 billion tonnes worldwide—covering metals also found in the seabed—with resources becoming scarcer and more expensive to extract^[11][12]. These statistics underscore DSM’s potential to drive energy transition efforts by making the transition more affordable and accessible. Albeit, that this comparison may not encompass all relevant factors, it provides a compelling perspective that motivates nations to pursue it.

Central to this idea is the financial profits of DSM that many coastal nations seek. The financial gains derived from DSM operations can be substantial, presenting an opportunity for nations to enhance their economic standing reaching numbers of billions of dollars, with one report suggesting a potential of up to 40 billion dollars^[13]. The economic potential combined with the increase of the minerals demand inevitably attracts investment, improving the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), creating new job opportunities, and funds for infrastructure and service enhancements, fostering overall economic growth^[14]. Examples supporting these speculations include the investment by the Metals Company in Nauru for DSM, Japan’s successful extraction of Zinc from the seabed in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the beginning of extraction projects by countries such as China, Japan, Nauru, and many other coastal nations in their own EEZ^[15][16]. Such developments strengthen the motivations for the world to begin the race to the deep sea to fuel energy transition and reap the economic benefits.

However, despite these promising prospects, the industry faces opposition driven by concerns over environmental harm and the inherent uncertainty associated with seabed mining. Though researchers credit the potential value of the DSM industry, they underscore the need for proper technology and regulations to prevent harm to marine life and ecosystems, including damage to microbes, corals, hydrothermal vents, and more^[17][18]. Instances like the Solwara Project in Papua, a failed DSM initiative, exemplify the resulting harm from the lack of proper regulation and technology in place, leading to environmental degradation, disruptions to cultural practices, and negative impacts on nearby communities, causing job losses for fishermen^[19]. Combined with the world’s “infancy” understanding of the deep ocean, there may still be implications that remain unknown or not fully grasped pertaining to the activities of DSM. This uncertainty has prompted organized opposition from state and non-state actors alike, from NGOs such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Greenpeace, multinational firms such as Google and Samsung, and nation-states —Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the EU countries^[20][21]. Despite the inherent contradiction of potentially exacerbating climate change, countries persist in pursuing DSM, driven by promises of economic growth and the industry’s emergence as a new key domain for power politics.

Considering the circumstances, it is reasonable to assert that DSM will shift the balance of power and trade relations in international politics. Historical events like colonialism, and resource wars such as the oil wars emphasize the pivotal role of resources in the domain of power and influence ^[22][23]. As previously established, the resources found through DSM would allow a significant increase in its supply, this circumstance allows resource-dependent nations like Japan and small island countries to transform into resource-rich countries. By diminishing their reliance on resource imports from countries like China and Russia, they can enhance their independence and assert themselves more in international politics, without the constraints of trade dependencies. Apart from reducing dependencies, the rising cost of minerals positions countries with access to DSM to better afford the manufacturing of renewable energy and conventional technologies. Granting them significant influence and power on the global stage, enhancing their role in geopolitics, negotiations, and overall leverage, resulting in a more significant role in shaping international relations^[24]. China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea and DSM, along with its dominance in exploration contracts from the International Seabed Authority (ISA)—the governing body over the deep sea—, indicate a clear intention to influence maritime norms and assert power by taking advantage of the DSM industry^[25][26]. Due to this, apart from the practical threats of DSM, the race to the deep seas may fuel geopolitical tensions, such as disputes between China and Japan in the South China Sea or among coastal states, and even exacerbate climate change as countries race for DSM without proper technologies, frameworks, and considerations to reap its benefits^[27][28]. Escalating tensions over seabed resources as terrestrial mining becomes costlier and minerals scarcer, and to reap the benefits of DSM.

Instead of serving as the starting point for a new era of resource abundance and fuel for the energy transition in the fight against climate change, the DSM industry remains a contentious issue, drawing scrutiny from the political, economic, and environmental dimensions. The unresolved environmental concerns and uncertainties surrounding DSM, if addressed, could position it as a substantial component in the battle against climate change to advance renewable energy technologies. Despite extensive literature on the practical aspects of DSM, the political implications remain a significant gap that is yet to be thoroughly discussed. Thus, the looming race for seabed exploitation underscores the urgent need for robust frameworks, thorough discussion, and ethical considerations to navigate the promises, threats, and implications towards international politics inherent in the emerging DSM industry.

References

Carver, R, J Childs, P Steinberg, L Mabon, H Matsuda, R Squire, B McLellan, and M Esteban. “A Critical Social Perspective on Deep Sea Mining: Lessons from the Emergent Industry in Japan.” Ocean & Coastal Management 193 (August 1, 2020): 105242. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105242.

Cohn, Theodore H. Global Political Economy Theory and Practice. 7th ed. Boston: Pearson, 2016.

Collier, Paul. “The Political Economy of Natural Resources.” Social Research 77, no. 4 (2010): 1105–32. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23347121.

Environmental Justice Foundation. “How the Rush to Deep-Sea Mining Threatens People and Our Planet.” Environmental Justice Foundation, March 2023.

Haugan, Peter M. , Lisa A. Levin, Diva Amon, Mark Hemer, Hannah Lily, and Finn Gunnar Nielsen . “What Role for Ocean-Based Renewable Energy and Deep-Seabed Minerals in a Sustainable Future?.” High Panel for Sustainable Ocean Economy, July 24AD.

Jasansky, Simon, Mirko Lieber, Stefan Giljum, and Victor Maus. “An Open Database on Global Coal and Metal Mine Production.” Scientific Data 10, no. 1 (January 24, 2023): 52. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-023-01965-y.

Mero, John L. The Mineral Resources of the Sea. Amsterdam, New York, Elsevier Pub. Co, 1965.

Sharma, Rahul. Perspectives on Deep-Sea Mining: Sustainability, Technology, Environmental Policy and Management. Springer, 2022.

Sharma, Rahul , ed. Deep-Sea Mining : Resource Potential, Technical and Environmental Considerations. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017.

Sonter, Laura J., Marie C. Dade, James E. M. Watson, and Rick K. Valenta. “Renewable Energy Production Will Exacerbate Mining Threats to Biodiversity.” Nature Communications 11, no. 1 (September 1, 2020): 4174. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17928-5.

Trainer, Jocelyn. “The Geopolitics of Deep-Sea Mining and Green Technologies.” United States Institute of Peace, November 3, 2022. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/geopolitics-deep-sea-mining-and-green-technologies.

^[1] John L Mero, The Mineral Resources of the Sea (Amsterdam, New York, Elsevier Pub. Co, 1965), 277-280.

^[2] Rahul Sharma, ed., Deep-Sea Mining: Resource Potential, Technical and Environmental Considerations (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 3-8.

^[3] Peter M. Haugan et al., “What Role for Ocean-Based Renewable Energy and Deep-Seabed Minerals in a Sustainable Future?” (High Panel for Sustainable Ocean Economy, July 24AD), 4.

^[4] Rahul Sharma, Perspectives on Deep-Sea Mining: Sustainability, Technology, Environmental Policy and Management (Springer, 2022), 221-225.

^[5] ibid

^[6] Sharma, 2022, 223-225.

^[7] Haugan et al., 19.

^[8] Sharma, 2017, 8-10.

^[9] Sharma, 2022, 29.

^[10] Laura J. Sonter et al., “Renewable Energy Production Will Exacerbate Mining Threats to Biodiversity,” Nature Communications 11, no. 1 (September 1, 2020): 4174, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-17928-5.

^[11] Haugan et al., 19-21.

^[12] Simon Jasansky et al., “An Open Database on Global Coal and Metal Mine Production,” Scientific Data 10, no. 1 (January 24, 2023): 52, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-023-01965-y.

^[13] Haugan et al., 30.

^[14] ibid

^[15] R Carver et al., “A Critical Social Perspective on Deep Sea Mining: Lessons from the Emergent Industry in Japan,” Ocean & Coastal Management 193 (August 1, 2020): 105242, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2020.105242.

^[16] Environmental Justice Foundation, 34.

^[17] Sharma, 2017, pp. 484-487

^[18] Environmental Justice Foundation, “How the Rush to Deep-Sea Mining Threatens People and Our Planet” (Environmental Justice Foundation, March 2023), 18.

^[19] Environmental Justice Foundation, 36.

^[20] Haugan et al., 35.

^[21]  Environmental Justice Foundation, 45.

^[22] Paul Collier, “The Political Economy of Natural Resources,” Social Research 77, no. 4 (2010): 1105–32, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23347121.

^[23]Theodore H Cohn, Global Political Economy Theory and Practice, 7th ed. (Boston: Pearson, 2016), 62-65.

^[24] Carver,

^[25] Sharma, 2022, 19-21.

^[26] Jocelyn Trainer, “The Geopolitics of Deep-Sea Mining and Green Technologies,” United States Institute of Peace, November 3, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/11/geopolitics-deep-sea-mining-and-green-technologies.

^[27] Carver,

^[28] Trainer,