The Contradiction of Religious Moderation and Extractivism

In the midst of the climate crisis, the role of religious organizations is increasingly crucial. Islamic religious organizations as the majority religion in Indonesia promote Green Islam (Jannah, 2024) as their commitment to the issue. However, this commitment is questioned by the ambivalent attitude of these religious organizations towards the climate crisis, especially because of the closeness of religious organizations with the government through the submission of Mining Licenses (IUP) to religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

This issue started with Joko Widodo (Jokowi)’s promise at the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) Congress in December 2021 (Siregar, 2024). This issue has become stronger again ahead of the 2024 Election. Prabowo Subianto, who at that time was still a Presidential Candidate, stated in Diskusi Bersama Perwakilan Kiai Kampung se-Indonesia (Discussion with Representatives of Village Kiai) in Malang, November 18 2023, that Jokowi has handed over a private mining permit to NU (Hakim, 2023).

This policy has reaped objections that question the management and possible conflicts of interest behind it. However, there is still another big question, how will the distribution of IUPs affect the commitment of religious organisations, especially NU, to moderation which has been advocated together with the Jokowi Government?

Since the first term in 2014-2019, Jokowi has shown his support for the issue of religious moderation (Alvian & Ardhani, 2023). Jokowi is collaborating with religious organisations, especially NU with its Islam Nusantara concept, to make religious moderation a success in Indonesia. In several statements, Jokowi firmly demonstrated his rejection of radical groups and stated that radical groups are not part of Indonesia and do not reflect Islam in Indonesia. Religious moderation is also included in one of the four National Priority Mental Revolution programs. This preparation and determination succeeded in encouraging religious moderation to be included in the 2020-2024 RPJMN (The National Medium-Term Development Planning).

The religious moderation policy proposed by the Ministry of Religion does not only cover inter-religious relations, but also relations with local culture. Mining as part of the extractive economy in Indonesia’s history has often damaged the environment and local culture (Reynolds, 2022). For example, nickel mining in Morowali–one of the objects that Prabowo Subianto will develop through his downstream policy (Rahayu, 2023)–causes environmental damage that is detrimental to the community. The inequality created by mining between migrant workers in nickel mines and local residents has also led to protests. The damage that occurs does not only occur on land, but also at sea in the form of pollution which is detrimental to the Bajo people, many of whom depend on the sea for their livelihoods (Irawati, 2020).

Thus, mining is often protested by various parties, including religious organisations. In East Nusa Tenggara, precisely near the Soga Mine, dozens of religious leaders (Catholics, Protestants and Muslims) formed Jatap Ecosob NTT (Network of Religious Leaders Concerned about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (Erb, 2016). The FNKSDA (Nahdliyyin Front for Natural Resources Sovereignty) which is affiliated with NU has also consistently shown its opposition to mining in various areas, such as Kendeng, Urut Sewu, and Tumpang Pitu which have attracted a lot of attention at the national level (Almujaddidy, 2021). This resistance is based on a religious understanding that is obliged to protect the environment.

The distribution of IUPs would have the potential to be contradictory to the vision of religious moderation and detrimental to local communities around the mine. Apart from its destructive nature, another potential contradiction is the use of religion and religious organisations to support mining which is rejected by the community. This step has been taken by PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara in West Nusa Tenggara, which has a predominantly Muslim population, through improvements to mosques, prayer rooms and Islamic boarding schools; sponsoring a communal meal for breaking feast in the month of Ramadan; and inviting local religious figures to give sermons (Welker, 2014). This support for Islamic religious activities contrasts with Newmont’s indifference to the religion of its Christian workers. Differences can also be seen if a comparison is made with PT Newmont Minahasa Raya in Sulawesi – with a large Muslim and Christian population – which did not take the same steps taken by Newmont Nusa Tenggara. Religious narratives even appear vulgar to justify mining in Bombana Regency, Southeast Sulawesi. The discovery of a gold mine in Wumbubangka Village in September 2008 was called by Nur Alam, the governor of Southeast Sulawesi 2008-2013, as a blessing of Lailatul Qadar (Upe, 2018).

Minority religious groups, such as adherents of indigenous religions, will be the most affected. Nature is often an important part of their cosmology. In Bangka Belitung, tin mining is detrimental to the Lom indigenous community (Zulkarnain, et al., 2019), which still adheres to many indigenous religions. Adherents of the gendang onè, lingko pe’an (the village inside, the forest outside) have been directly involved in the movement against mining together with Catholic groups in Manggarai, East Nusa Tenggara (Arti, 2020).

While the Muhammadiyah Green Cadre expressed their rejection (Putra, 2024), GP Ansor showed support for the distribution of IUPs (Gayati, 2024). NU’s own position is indeed inconsistent in dealing with mining issues, especially among its elites. An example can be seen in the case in Banyuwangi (Alkatiri & Kiwang, 2023). Yenny Wahid, daughter of Abdurrahman Wahid, an important NU figure, was once a director at PT. Merdeka Copper Gold and resigned after a conflict occurred between Merdeka Copper Gold and the community in Sumberagung. However, this did not end NU’s closeness to PT BSI, a subsidiary of Merdeka Copper Gold. The proof is that the head of the assembly of the Pesanggaran branch of the NU was given a position in company management. The General Chair of PBNU 2010-2021, Said Aqil Siroj, also did not show any opposition to mining, but instead encouraged a “crosscheck” first. NU’s involvement in fighting anti-mining parties can also be seen from the joining of GP Ansor into the Massa Gerakan Anti Kebangkitan Komunis (Mass Anti-Communist Resurrection Movement). Evoking old NU vs PKI sentiments, the protests against the mine were framed as part of the Communist movement. One of the victims of this accusation was Budi Pego who was sentenced to four years in prison and was terrorised before being arrested.

The distribution of IUPs to religious organisations is a gamble for efforts to achieve religious moderation. Moderation is not in line with an extractive economy which actually damages the environment and marginalises local culture and indigenous religion. Without firm alignment, the commitment of the government and religious organisations to religious moderation is questionable. Is the vision the government and religious organisations like NU are promoting nothing more than the extraction of moderation itself?

References

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Almujaddidy, A.I. (2021). Progressive Muslim Environmentalism: The Eco-Theology and Ethics of the Nahdliyyin Front for Sovereignty over Natural Resources (FNKSDA). In Z.A. Bagir, M.S. Northcott, & F. Wijsen (eds.) Varieties of Religion and Ecology: Dispatches from Indonesia. Zurich: LIT Verlag.

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Jannah, A.N. (2024). Expert Meeting on Green Islam: Igniting Faith-Led Environmentalism Action in Indonesia. Studia Islamika, 31(2), 397-403.

Rahayu, R. (2023). Catatan Tim Prabowo-Gibran Ihwal Hilirisasi dan Insiden Smelter Morowali. Tempo.co, December 28. Accessed from https://www.tempo.co/ekonomi/catatan-tim-prabowo-gibran-ihwal-hilirisasi-dan-insiden-smelter-morowali-103889.

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